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Abstract
This paper examines the sources of wage differentials among caste/ethnic
groups, employing national survey data from Nepal. Our study shows that, in
countries such as Nepal which have imperfect labour markets, the conventional
Oaxaca decomposition methodology fails to estimate precisely the source of wage
differential. Using an extended model, occupational choice, firm size distribution
and the interaction between these two are employed along with the conventionally
used meaures of human capital endowments of different groups, to estimate these
effects. Our results indicate that the lack of access to better paying occupations
and larger firms, rather than differences in human capital, are the main factors
underlying the caste/ethnic wage differentia in Nepal. Furthermore, empirical
evidence is not found in favour of government policy of ‘affirmative action’ to
contribute yet in narrowing down the caste/ethnic wage differential in the labour
market.
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1 Introduction
The system of caste classification allocates social labor on the basis of caste hierarchy
and restricts occupational mobility (Banerjee and Knight, 1985). This discrimination
has two major effects on the labor market. First, caste-classification discourages low-
caste workers from developing human capital endowments compatible with occupations
assigned to the higher castes. Second, it subjects backward castes to an informational
disadvantage because of their exclusion from certain sectors of employment. In turn,
a caste-based division of labor can perpetuate itself through the inter-generational
transmission of occupational status from one generation to the next (Borjas, 1994;
Tyree, 991; Darity and Mason, 1998).
This paper examines the sources of wage differentials among castes/ethnic groups in
Nepal, a country in which, until 1963, an age-old, caste-based social division of labor
was imposed by the national legal code Muluki Ain. The new Muluki Ain of 1963
discarded this caste system. However, caste based discrimination was itself declared
illegal only after the promulgation of a new Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal
in 1990 (this made the practice of untouchability illegal). Since then, several policies
have been implemented to reduce the impact of such discrimination, including positive
discrimination and the establishment of a Dalit Commission. The Second Amendment
of the Civil Service Act, 1993, reserves 45% of total vacancies in the public sector
for backward castes, female, disabled and remote inhabitants. The effects of such
policies are not known, partly due to the lack of rigorous research on the subject. This
paper partly aims to fill this gap. A relative descrease in wage differential due to the
gorup difference in access to better paid jobs, larger firm, will indicate the positive
contribution of this policy.
In doing so, we take into account the modern empirical literature on the subject,
which distinguishes between ‘current market’ and ‘pre-market’ labor discrimination.
The later type of effects are known in the literature to contribute to the persistence
of wage inequality even if active discrimination is no longer in current practice by
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employers. Our main methodological contribution is to use an expanded set of proxies
for detecting the presence of such pre-market effects.
The Oaxaca decomposition method is the most commonly used technique for dis-
entangling ‘pre-market’ from ‘current market’ discrimination. Empirical studies have
focused on the human capital endowment as the sole proxy for pre-market effects
(Grimshaw and Rubey, 2002). Additionally, Darity and Mason (1998) identifies ‘group’
differences in access to better paying jobs within industries and occupations as ma-
jor contributive factors of persistence in labor market discrimination. Empirical work
carried out by Madheswaran and Attewell (2007) and Banerjee and Knight (1985) es-
timate such effects in the Indian labor market by incorporating occupation in the wage
differential decomposition method.
In this paper, we question the adequacy of using only education and occupation as
proxies for pre-market effects in countries that have imperfectly competitive markets
for both labor and goods and services. The reason is that, in imperfectly competitive
markets, there might exist a hierarchy of employers that pay differently to workers
of the same educational level and occupational classification. For instance, in Nepal,
where the public sector is a significant employer of white-collar workers (Moore, 2006)
jobs are categorized by grade, with each grade associated with its own point in the
overall pay scale. Engineers, doctors, administrators or accountants falling into a given
grade all receive similar wages. However, the private sector may display segmentation
within the same market, so that different firms might display different levels of both
profitability and ability to pay higher wages (Bluestone, 1974; Vietorisz and Harrison,
1973).
In such a situation, workers’ characteristics such as education and occupation might
matter less than employer characteristics in explaining observed difference in labor mar-
ket outcomes. We thus proxy better paid jobs by firm size to acknowledge this possibil-
ity. The empirical literature has provided evidence that larger firms hire higher quality
workers (Brown and Medoff, 1989). Similarly, Schmidt and Zimmermann (1991) and
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Hettler (2007) have shown a positive relationship between firm size and the wage rate.
Thus, workers from marginalized castes inherit limited occupational choices as well
as unequal access to better firms, proxied by firm size. Accordingly, we expand the
Oaxaca decomposition method to use occupation, firm size and their interaction as
indicators of caste/ethnicity-specific ‘endowments’ rather than as control variables.
Therefore, three separate decomposition models are estimated in investigating the
sources of caste/ethnic wage differentials in the labor market.
Our results indicate that wage discrimination is indeed present in the Nepalese
labor market, with intermediate and low castes earning significantly less than the
higher castes. Section 2 offers a precise classification of the different caste/ethnic group
combinations that we use in our analysis. Moreover, lack of access by intermediate and
low castes to employment in larger firms is found as an important factor behind the
caste wage differential while years of schooling explains only a small portion of the
differential.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the historical and
institutional basis of caste classification in Nepal. Section 3 reviews the evidence on
labor market discrimination in developing countries and highlights the linkage between
the caste system and the persistence of labor market discrimination. Section 4 states
the econometric model, while the data and descriptive statistics are presented in Section
5. The main econometric results are presented in Section 6. Section 7 concludes.
2 Caste system in Nepal: An overview
Nepal, along with other countries, had a caste-based social division of labor in the past.
Historically, caste classification in the Indian sub-continent was based on the Varna
system of Hindu philosophy and the Aryan division of labor. These comprised four
categories, namely Brahman, Ksyatriyas (Chhetri), Vaisyas and Shudras. Together
these encompassed a social division of labor as priests and teachers, warier and royalty,
merchants and money lenders, and artisans, service providers and other menial workers,
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respectively (Deshpande, 2011). Brahman, being the superior caste, enjoyed the best
status in the Nepalese society followed by Chhetri. While Vaisyas did not seem as
privileged as Brahmans or Chhetri, they enjoyed a relatively higher social status than
Shudras on the caste based social hierarchy. Shudras were the lowest caste, considered
untouchable by their superiors.
As a predominantly Hindu country with a significant Buddhist minority, Nepal’s
adopted the Hindu caste system came with some local variation, implemented in the
form of a legal code called Muluki Ain. This code classified all Nepalese into different
categories irrespective of their religious backgrounds, but based on their relative ritual
purity (Lynn et al., 2008). The official classification under Muluki Ain consisted of
three categories, namely Tagadhari (literally “twice-born”), Matwali (literally “liquor
drinking”) and Pani Nachalne (literally “impure”) (Cox, 1988). Tagadahari included
upper-caste Hindus such as the Brahmans of the traditional Hindu caste system. Mat-
wali, on the other hand, consisted mainly of Buddhists and indigenous ethnic groups
who practiced Animism and Shamanism, and were considered an intermediate caste.
The Pani Nachalne were the lowest caste and included not just traditional Hindu
untouchables such as Kami, Sarki, etc. but also Muslims and Mlecha (literally ‘for-
eigners’), who in turn included Christians.
This is where the intersection of caste and ethnicity entered into the social hierar-
chy of Nepal. Andres (1979) and Gurung (2002) describe a hierarchy of ethnic groups
and their respective association with the legal caste categories. This divides all ethnic
groups into two broader categories of Pure and Impure caste hierarchies consisting of
three and two subcategories, respectively (see Table 1). While ethnic groups belong-
ing to the Tagadhari and Matwali castes, fell under Pure (or Water Acceptable, i.e.
sharing water with them was acceptable), the Pani Nachalne were Impure (or Water
Unacceptable). Within these there were sub-categories: while the Pure Matwali were
divided into Enslavable and Non-enslavable ethnic groups, the Impure Pani Nachalne
were further divided into Untouchable and Touchable, depending on whether or not
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they belonged to Hindu religious groups.
In line with these classifications, we aggregate caste-ethnic identity into three broad
categories, namely Tagadhari, Matwali and Pani Nachalne. Lack of observations on
the Enslavable Matwali and Touchable Pani Nachalne groups prevents us from con-
structing a finer division of the social hierarchy. In addition, we use an additional
category of Other caste for those who cannot be classified into the three main cate-
gories. This could be for one of three reasons: (i) their ethnicity was not identified; (ii)
it was identified as ‘Other’; or (iii) it was identified as belonging to one of the (usually
very small) ethnic groups which were not classified under the old Muluki Ain.
We estimate the impact of labor-market endowments and job characteristics, hu-
man capital (education), occupation, and firm size, on ethnic wage differentials by
applying Blinder (1973); Oaxaca (1973) decomposition technique and the model ex-
tended by Banerjee and Knight (1985). We expand the decomposition methodology
to incorporate occupation, firm size and their interaction into the model.
3 Labor market discrimination and the caste sys-
tem
Caste/ethnic labor market discrimination is defined as a situation in which a person
who provides labor market services and is equally productive in a physical and material
sense is paid less in a way that is related to caste or ethnicity (Altonji and Blank, 1999).
This concept emerged from the theories of taste discrimination, whereby employers
directly hold preferences about the ethnic background of their employees (Becker, 1957,
1971) and statistical discrimination, whereby employers have incomplete information
about workers productivity and statistical priors about how productivity varies with
ethnicity (Arrow, 1971; Akerlof, 1984; Phelps, 1972). Both these theories are based
on a neoclassical model that implies that competition will lead to the elimination of
race or gender discrimination in the long run. Under perfect competition and different
degrees of prejudicial tastes, employers with the least taste for discrimination will hire
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members of a minority group but pay them a lower wage than equally qualified non-
minorities (Chase, 2000). By paying less than the equilibrium wage, those employers
earn profits in the short run. In the long run, however, taste discrimination disappears
with insolvency of prejudiced firms and new entry of less prejudiced competitors into
the market. Similarly, if group differences in ability are perceived to exist by employers
but are not real, as the theory of statistical discrimination assumes, employers will
update their beliefs over time (Darity and Mason, 1998).
A range of empirical studies have tested these theories and found evidence for
the existence of gender and ethnic discrimination in multi-racial countries in Latin
American and Southern Africa (Atal et al., 2009; Lovell, 2006; Larrea and Torres,
2006; Patrinos, 1997; Szelewicki and Jonna, 2009). Other authors have looked into
the persistence of discrimination caused by “pre-” or “extra-market” processes, which
reduce the earning power of previously discriminated-against groups (Madden, 1975).
According to this view, the main type of ‘pre-market’ effect is the inter-generational
transmission of low levels of education. The reason is that when a generation of
workers grows up suffering directly from discrimination, not only is their own education
undermined, but even if the discrimination ends during their lifetime, they have both
less incentive (via higher discounting of the returns to education) and fewer means (via
lower income) to invest in the education of their own children (Agee and Crocker, 1996).
Moreover, because less educated parents are less capable of helping their offspring with
schoolwork than are their more educated, higher income counterparts, children from
disadvantaged groups are likely to fare worse in schooling outcome than their privileged
counter-parts (Bond, 1981). Ermisch and Francesconi (2001) also demonstrates that
parental educational background is a significant determinant of a child’s educational
achievement.
Other authors have emphasized the effect of that low levels of inter-generational
transmission of educational attainment have on limiting occupational mobility across
generations (Checchi, 1997). This can become an additional factor along with low ed-
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ucational endowments per se in reinforcing persistence of labor market discrimination.
Madheswaran and Attewell (2007) and Banerjee and Knight (1985) both find evidence
in favour of this hypothesis. An additional factor generating persistence of labor mar-
ket discrimination is imperfect competition across employers (Botwinick, 1993; Darity
and Williams, 1985). These authors argue that, in the absence of current discrimina-
tion, perfect competition would drive employers to offer workers of a given educational
level and occupation the same wages, under imperfect competition, more profitable
employers would be able to offer higher wages to employees, despite similarities in
education, occupation and industry-type. This approach emphasizes how inequality
across different groups of workers in access to jobs with employers who pay higher
wages (Darity and Mason, 1998) can persist over time as a result of past discrimina-
tion and suggests that the wage structure across social groups should be studied as a
joint function of individual and employer characteristics.
While considerable attention has been paid to labor market discrimination based
on race and gender, less attention has been paid to the issue of caste even though caste-
based discrimination might be more powerful and persistent than racial discrimination.
Racism emerged in countries that were either colonized or participated in the slave
trade during the colonial era, while caste-based societies have existed for centuries
before colonialism (Deshpande, 2011). Moreover while, apart from the master-slave
division of slavery, the colonial powers did not impose strict occupational restrictions
on the subject population, caste-based stratification was inherently associated with an
occupational division of labor.
Akerlof (1984) describes a caste-segregated society as being more self-perpetuating
than one in which current discrimination is of the ‘tastes’ or ‘statistical’ variety. The
reason for this is a self-enforcing mechanism inherent in the caste system, whereby
third parties punish any employer-employee pair who deviate from the caste division,
by casting out both from normal society. He shows that a caste equilibrium exists in
which no single member of either the dominant or disadvantaged group is willing to
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break away from the caste division of labor, despite the presence of potential bilateral
gains between employers and employees from doing so. In practice, as pointed by
Deshpande (2011), members of disadvantaged castes also adhere to the caste structure
out of self-fulfilling sense of fatalism. Thus, even after countries such as India and
Nepal legally outlawed caste discrimination, the tendency for caste discrimination to
persist through decentralized behaviour continued.
Das and Dutta (2007) estimated the caste wage differential in both regular and
casual jobs in the Indian labor market. The results showed that a substantial differen-
tial existed between Scheduled Castes (SC) and General Castes (GC) in regular jobs,
but not in casual ones, with almost two third of the differential in regular jobs being
attributable to endowment effects. However, while their endowment variable included
both educational and occupational proxies, amongst others, it did not explicitly differ-
entiate between different types of endowment; therefore, their study cannot explicitly
report on the impact of specific types of endowment differences on the caste wage
differential.
In a similar study of the wage differential between scheduled and non-scheduled
caste migrants in Delhi, Banerjee and Knight (1985) found that low-caste workers
were more likely to be engaged in traditional low-paid jobs. By extending the conven-
tional decomposition methodology to include occupational access as part of a worker’s
pre-market endowment, they found that a significant part of the caste wage differential
was attributable to difference in access to better paid occupations. In a study of regular
salaried jobs in India, Madheswaran and Attewell (2007) found that endowment differ-
ences were more significant than current wage differences in explaining the caste wage
differential, and further, that the most important type of difference in endowments was
the difference in occupation across castes.
To summarize, these studies highlight the fact that pre-market effects of discrimi-
nation are more important than current market discrimination in explaining the persis-
tence of the caste wage differential in India, with the difference in access to better paid
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jobs as a major factor in promoting pre-market differences. However, none of these
studies have considered access to employment in larger firms as a factor in explaining
endowment differences. Moreover, an empirical study on Nepalese labor market has
not been carried out as yet, even along the lines of the studies on India discussed above.
This is an important gap which needs to be filled in light of the fact that Nepal is the
only country to have had a long history of a legally imposed caste based division of
labor.
4 Empirical Model
Consider Tagadhari workers as the dominant/reference group and Matwali, Pani Nachalne
and Other caste workers as the non-dominant/comparison groups. Denoting them by
d and n, respectively, the earning function for both types of workers can be written as,
w¯d = fd(x¯d), (1)
w¯n = fn(x¯n), (2)
where w¯d and w¯n are the mean of log of hourly wage and x¯d and x¯n represents a set of
average productivity characteristics associated with d and n workers, respectively.
In the conventional Oaxaca methodology, the gross difference in mean log wages
between the two groups can be decomposed into explained differences in the individual
productivity characteristics (E) and unexplained differences in the market valuation
of such individual productivity characteristics (D),
w¯d − w¯n = fd(x¯d − x¯n) + x¯n(fd − fn)
= E +D. (3)
In equation 3, E denotes the wage difference attributable to the difference in edu-
cational attainment and other labour market characteristics between the two groups,
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evaluated according to the dominant group’s wage structure. D represents the wage
difference because of the difference in wage structure between the two groups, evalu-
ated at the mean education and labour market characteristics of the reference group’s.
The former term represents the explained component of the wage differential whereas
the later term indicates the unexplained component. These are known respectively as
the “pre-market” discrimination and the “current” market discrimination.
Banerjee and Knight (1985) extended the Oaxaca methodology by incorporating
differences in occupational distribution across caste/ethnic workers,
w¯d − w¯n =
∑
k
(pkdw¯kd − pknw¯kn)
=
∑
k
pkdfkd(x¯kd)− pknfkn(x¯kn)
=
∑
k
pkn[fkd(x¯kd)− fkn(x¯kn)] +
∑
k
fkd(x¯kd)(pkd − pkn)
= W + J, (4)
where w¯kj represents the log hourly mean wage of the j
th group in the kth occupation,
and pkj represents the sample proportion of workers belonging to the j
th group in the
kth occupation.
The first component of the final equation represents the wage difference between
the two groups due to differences in their wage structures. The second component
reflects wage differences due to differences in occupational attainment between the
two groups. We have already seen how the first component can be decomposed using
the Oaxaca methodology. In addition, since the occupational attainment of different
groups can be the result of both differences in productivity characteristics and labor
market discrimination, the second component can also be decomposed into explained
and unexplained components. Thus the final decomposition suggested by Banerjee and
Knight (1985) is
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w¯d − w¯n =
∑
k
pkn[fkd(x¯kd)− fkd(x¯kn)] +
∑
k
pkn(fkd(x¯kn)− fkn(x¯kn))
+
∑
k
w¯kd(pkd − pˆkn) +
∑
k
w¯kd(pˆkn − pkn)
= WE +WD + JE + JD (5)
WE and WD in equation (5) are similar to E and D in equation (3) but disaggre-
gated by occupational categories as indicated by sub-script k. As before, the first term
WE represents group differences in wages characteristics evaluated at the reference
groups’ wage structure, weighted by the occupational distribution of the comparison
group. The second term WD reflects differences in wages evaluated on the basis of
mean productivity characteristics, weighted by the occupational distribution of the
comparison group.
The final two terms on the right hand side of equation (5) represent the sum
of group differences in access to occupational categories. In both these terms, pˆkn
is the probability of group n being in occupation k given that they had a similar
occupational function to that of group d. It represents the predicted representation of
the non-dominant group in occupation k.
The term JE depicts the wage difference arising from a difference between the
observed representation of the dominant group and the predicted representation of the
non-dominant group in occupation k. This term therefore reflects the difference in
observable productivity characteristics of the two groups. The term JD depicts the
wage difference arising from the difference between the observed and the predicted
participation of the non-dominant group in occupation k. This therefore captures
the unexplained or ’market’ discrimination in access of the non-privileged group to
occupation k.
Using a multinomial logit model, we compute pˆkn ,
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pˆkn =
exp(βkdxn)∑
j=1 exp(βjdxn)
, (6)
where βkd is a vector of coefficients associated with the dominant group d in the k
th
occupation. The independent variables xn used in the multinomial logit model are
education, experience and experience squared.
The Banerjee-Knight methodology extends the traditional Oaxaca decomposition
by disaggregating the difference in wage structure by occupational categories and then
further decomposing the occupational access affect into explained and unexplained
components. However, their methodology restricts itself to occupational attributes
as the only additional variable in explaining job discrimination in the labor market.
As we argued above, access to medium and large firms can play a considerable role
in producing caste/ethnic wage differentials. Descriptive statistics show that there is
a significant differences in wages across firm size, even within the same occupational
categories, as used in Banerjee and Knight (1985). Thus, to the extent that wage
differences arising from occupational differences are positively correlated with wage
differences arising from firm size effects, the Banerjee-Knight estimates could overstate
the impact of occupational difference on wage differentials.
We applied an alternative approach by interacting firm size with occupational dum-
mies in estimating caste/ethnic wage differentials. We compute three results: (i) the
Banerjee and Knight (1985) model which uses occupation as the additional variable,
(ii) an identical model which uses firm size instead of occupation, and (iii) a model
which interacts firm size and occupational dummies. The third decomposition model
can be written as:
w¯d − w¯n =
∑
i
pin(fin(x¯id − x¯in)) +
∑
i
pin(fid(x¯in)− fin(x¯in))
+
∑
i
w¯id(pid − pˆkn) +
∑
i
w¯id(pˆin − pin)
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= WE ′ +WD′ + JE ′ + JD′, (7)
where i is the index identifying the interaction between occupation and firm size.
An identical multinomial logit model as in equation (6) is employed to predict group
n’s probability to be represented across different firm sizes as well as in each of the
interaction categories.
5 Data and descriptive statistics
This paper employs two waves of the National Living Standard Survey of Nepal for
2003/2004 and 2010/2011 carried out by the Central Bureau of Statistics of Nepal with
the combined support of the World Bank and the UK Department for International
Development (This surveys will be referred below as 2003 and 2010, respectively.) The
surveys follow the World Bank’s Living Standard Measurement Survey Strategy and
apply a two-stage sampling scheme. 73 out of the 75 administrative districts of Nepal
are covered. A total of 3333 households in 2003 and 5998 households in 2010 were
interviewed, and information recorded about 30043 and 28670 individuals in each of
the respective years. The information includes labor market data on wage employment,
self employment, sector of employment, industry type, mode of payment, labor market
attachment and educational attainment at the individual level. Since information on
experience is not reported, it is proxied by age minus years of schooling minus six which
is an average age to start school in the Nepalese education system. For simplicity, it is
assumed that every person joined the labor market immediately after completing their
schooling. An individual is defined as “employed” if he/she worked at least one hour
during the seven days prior to the interview.
This analysis includes 4490 wage workers in 2003 and 4169 wage workers in 2010
in both the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors. Table 2 reports the caste/ethnic
distribution for both samples. The Tagadhari group represents a dominant share of
wage employee in both periods accounting for 33.13% of the total employment in 2003
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and 38.31% in the later period. The Matwali accounts for 26% and 23.94%, Pani
Nachalne 17.47% and 13.53% , and Othecaste for 23.40% and 24.23%, for 2003 and
2010, respectively.
Descriptive statistics in tables 4 and 5 show an average log hourly wage rate of 2.69
and 3.38 NPR respectively. The USD equivalent would be .040, and .045 respectively,
based on an average exchange rate of 1 USD = 72.86 NPR in 2003 and = 74.36 NPR
in 2010. The Matwali, Pani Nachalne and Other caste workers earn average wage less
by 38%, 50% and 52% than the Tagadhari workers respectively, in 2003. Wage gaps
between workers remain almost constant in the later period accounting for 33%, 51%
and 57% for the smae comparison groups. Average years of education, defined as the
highest level of completed years of schooling were 3.51 in 2003 and 5.43 in 2010.
Firm size, proxied by the number of employees, is not responded by many wage
workers in the surveys. Approximately, 31% (1415 out of 4490) wage workers in 2003
and 45% ( 1909 out of 4169 ) wage workers in 2010 had reported the number of
employees with their employer. This gives the ratio of firm size categories: small
firm, medium firm and large firm as 7.84%, 40.71% and 51.45% respectively, in 2003,
and 6.33%, 33.84% and 60.03%, respectively, in 2010. As we intend to estimate the
impact of difference on occupational distribution and firm size association on wage
differential among four caste/ethnic categories this limited response on number of
employees reduces the sample size which in turns affects our estimation strategy. We,
thus imputed firm size as small firm for those who did not reported the number of
employees unless detectable as large firm on the basis of individual occupations, i.e. if
the occupation is reported as government or armed forces the employer is categorized
as a large firm. This increases the sample size considerably to 4490 in 2003 and 4169
in 2010. However, the composition of firm size categories completely reversed after the
imputation (see table 3). It also changed the occupational compostion to be included
in the small sample. After the imputation the agricultural and construction workers
became the major component to represent the small firm category. This may not effect
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the analysis of occupational effect since agricultural as well as cinstruction labourers
falls into the unskilled categories in our analysis. However, in evaluating the firm
size effect, which we intend to do, this might give an impression that caste/ethnic
wage differential is mainly caused by their differences in association with agricultural
labourers and otherwise rather than depicting the impact of firm size. This will not
impede us to test our argument that access to better paid jobs play a significant role
in widening caste/ethnic wage gap. We briefly discussed this issue in the sub-section
6.4 below.
The majority of wage employees work for small firms, which accounts for 70.96%
and 53.2% of all employees in each sample year respectively, while the next share
of employees is in large firms, which accounted for 16.08% and 31.21%, respectively.
Small firms are defined as those that employ only one worker, medium-size firms were
defined as employing 2-10 workers and large firms as employing more than 10 workers.
Similarly, most workers are in unskilled (a generic term for porters, garbage collec-
tors, etc.) and agricultural occupations. These two categories of occupations together
accounted for approximately, 64% in each sample year. Occupational categories such
as professional and clerical, which are considered as white collar jobs are limited to
16% in 2003 and 18% in 2010. Of these, 68% and and 71% is occupied by Tagad-
hari caste/ethnic worker in each respective year. Matwali, Pani Nachalne and Other
caste caste ethnic workers share, respectively, by 11%, 6% and 15% of white collar
jobs in 2003. This measure stands approximately at 14%, 3% and 10% for respec-
tive caste/ethnic workers in the second survey. Other occupational catagories are
distributed almost proportionately. This evidence indicates that the majority of wage
earners in Nepal were casual laborers, not associated with any specific type of industry,
unlike long-term contract workers.
The caste based stratification of the social hierarchy is reflected in the educational
attainment of different ethnic groups. The Pani Nachalne group, classified as untouch-
able in the historical caste hierarchy, display the lowest average years of schooling:
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1.75 and 2.82 years, respectively in each of the sample years. On the other hand,
the Tagadhari group displays the highest average years of schooling: 5.72 and 8.26
years, respectively for the same periods. The Matwali and Other caste groups display
intermediate levels of schooling in each year.
Despite the implementation of positive discrimination in favor of low caste/ethnic
groups, a significant difference in better paid jobs persists in the Nepalese labor mar-
ket. The privileged Tagadhari group by itself accounts for approximately 60% of the
employees of large firms in each of the sample years, despite the fact that the inter-
mediate Matwali groups have increased their participation in such firms considerably.
The Pani Nachalne and the Other caste groups remain almost in same proportion
throughout the analysis. A similar picture emerges if, instead of firm type, we look
at employment by occupational category. The Tagadhari group alone occupies ap-
proximately, 60% of white collar jobs which is a significantly higher ratio than that of
their sample proprotion. The Pani Nachalne displays the lowest representation in such
jobs in both periods. This further indicates that historically backward ethnic workers
remain constrained to work in low paid occupations.
6 Econometric analysis
6.1 Baseline regression analysis
Regression analysis is carried out separately for each sample period. Estimated coeffi-
cients are listed in tables 7 and 8 for 2003 and 2010, respectively. The first column in
each table shows regression results for all caste/ethnic groups included in the sample,
followed by a separate regression for Tagadhari, Matwali, Pani Nachalne and Other
caste in columns 2, 3, 4 and 5, respectively. The last column of the tables shows
coefficients associated with ethnic dummy variables using the Tagadhari caste/ethnic
group as the base category.
Ethnic dummy coefficients for Matwali, Pani Nachalne and Other caste are -.01,
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-.072 and -.162 in 2003 and .032, .070 and -.103 in 2010, respectively. The coeffi-
cients associated with Matwali are not statistically significant in either period; Pani
Nachalne coefficients are significant at the 5% level in both periods and the Other
caste coefficients are significant at 1% level in both periods. Surprisingly in 2010, the
Pani Nachalne caste/ethnic dummy displays a statistically significant positive coeffi-
cient, seemingly contradicting the prime facie evidence of lower wages for this group.
However, we shall see from the decomposition results that discrimination remains pos-
itive and the OLS results might be influenced by the fact that the human capital gap
between the dominant group and the Pani Nachalne seems to have narrowed.
Returns to education for the pooled sample are positive, increasing with time, and
significant at the 1% level in each sample year: .038 in 2003 and .06 in 2010. However,
they vary considerably across ethnic groups. The Tagadhari enjoy the highest returns
amongst all groups in both years, with all coefficients strongly positive and significant
at the 1% level. The Matwali and Other caste have somewhat lower but still fairly
positive returns and coefficients for these castes are uniformly significant at 1% level
across the sample years. The Pani Nachalne have been the most disadvantaged group.
However, even this group seems to have caught up in this dimension with other groups
so that in 2010 this coefficient was almost identically positive and significant across all
groups.
As expected, firm size seems to play a crucial role in determining individual earnings
in the Nepalese labor market. For example, in 2003, those working in medium-size and
large-size firm were likely to earn 57% and 72% in the Tagadhari subsample; 45% and
70% for Matwali ; 43% and 1.09% for Pani Nachalne, and 55% and 80% for Other
caste subsample. These coefficients are not significantly changed when ethnic dummy
variables are included (see the last column of Table 7). Firm size effects decreased
considerably by 2010. 1
1One possible reason for this reduction in firm size effect can be attributed to rapid unionization
in recent decades, along with the ascent to power of the Nepalese Communist Party Maoist (NCPM).
The NCPM has been a strong proponent of the betterment of economically disadvantaged groups
and unionization and collective bargaining have been strengthened since the NCPM came to political
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The results for occupational (with reference group = unskilled workers) coefficients
were qualitatively similar but of mixed significance across the sample periods.
6.2 Multinomial regression results
The actual distributions of disadvantaged workers being in particular occupational and
firm size categories are compared with the expected distributions for these workers in
Tables 9 and 10 respectively. Analogous measures for the joint distributions across firm
size-occupation categories are presented in Table ?? for the year 2003 and in Table 12
for the year 2010. The expected distributions are predicted by education, experience
and experience squared, as outlined in section 4.
We measure the under- or over-representation of each of the comparison groups in a
particular job category by the difference between actual and predicted representations.
By this measure, in 2003, workers belonging to each comparison group were signif-
icantly under-represented in white collar (i.e. professional and clerical) and skilled
occupations but over-represented in the unskilled and agricultural occupations. The
magnitude of under representation in white collar jobs was the highest for the Pani
Nachalne workers, by 9% in professional, 3% in clerical and 7% in skilled occupations.
These tendencies continued even into the later period with only negligible decreases in
magnitude.
Analogous to the distribution across occupations, the comparison groups are under-
represented in larger firm over both periods of the analysis. More importantly, the
firm size distribution seems more regressive than the occupational distribution and to
have increased over time. For example, in 2003 the attainment gap between actual
and predicted values for employment in large firms was 6% for Matwali, 7% for Pani
Nachalne and 9% for Other Castes. In 2010, these figures had increased to 18%, 21%
and 23% respectively for each group.
The joint distribution over firm size interacted with occupation indicates that the
power in 2006.
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comparison groups are uniformly over-represented in agricultural jobs held in small
enterprises and generally under-represented in larger firms across almost all occupa-
tions. At the same time, while the comparison groups are generally over-represented
in the unskilled occupations over both sample periods, they are under-represented in
the unskilled occupational category within the large firms. This underlines the im-
portance of distinguishing between firm-size and occupational effects in labour market
discrimination.
6.3 Decomposition results
As discussed in the section 4, we employed three different types of decomposition
in estimating the impact of different factors on the caste/ethnic wage differential.
These models are hereafter referred to as the Occupational, Firm size and Interaction
decomposition models.
Each model consist of four components; namely (1) Wage Explained (WE): the
wage difference attributable to the difference in personal characteristics, (2) Wage Un-
explained (WD): the wage difference caused by the difference in market valuation of
such characteristics, (3) Job Explained (JE): the wage differential attributable to the
group difference in access to better occupations and/or firms, as explained by the av-
erage human capital characteristics of each group and (4) Job Unexplained (JD): the
wage differential attributable to the difference in access to better paid job that can
not be explained by human capital characteristics. Job explained and wage explained
together correspond to the pre-market effect on individual earnings while wage dis-
crimination and job discrimination jointly explain the current market discrimination.
The estimated decomposition results are presented in tables 13 and 14 for the year
2003 and 2010, respectively. For each model, these tables present only the summary
results. Details are not presented in order to save space but can be provided upon
request.
The decomposition results show that the differences in human capital endowments,
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generally considered to be the main source of wage gaps among workers, only weakly
explain the wage differential. Considering the Interaction model, in 2003 data, this
component only explained 5.45% of the wage differential between Tagadhari and Pani
Nachalne. For the other two comparison groups in 2003, and for all groups in 2010
data, the same effect was less than 4%. The latter is not surprising since by 2010,
workers in each comparison group had significantly increased their average years of
education. Indeed, workers in the Matwali and Pani Nachalne groups had registered
a larger perecntage increase in their average human capital endowments than those in
the reference group.
The two other decomposition models give slightly larger values for this effect. This
is also not surprising since the models without interaction are likely to overstate the
estimated coefficients for all components.
The second component of the wage differential, namely wage discrimination (WD),
also did not show a significant impact on wage differential. The maximum effect was
7.15% which applied to the Pani Nachalne group in the Interaction model in 2010
data. In other cases, this effect was even negative across all comparison groups in at
least one decomposition model and/or one period of analysis.
The components relating to occupational and firm size effects, by contrast, show
considerably larger effects. For example, the Interaction model shows that in 2003,
approximately 21% of the wage gap for both Matwali and Pani Nachalne (when each is
compared to the reference Tagadhari group) could be explained by the component JE,
which measures the difference in access to the better paid jobs, arising from differences
in human capital endowments. The unexplained component of the difference in access
to better paid jobs, JD, explained up to 16% of the wage gap for the Pani Nachalne
and the Other caste groups (in the Interaction model). This effect, however, remained
smaller than the explained effect JE for all but not the Other caste group.
By 2010, the unexplained part of the wage gap arising from access to better paid
jobs had increased significantly for all groups. For each group, it had become larger
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than the explained part. The switch in relative importance of JD versus JE between
the two sample periods is most significant the Matwali group. Across all the decom-
position models used, JE went from 17%-21% in 2003, to 6%-8% in 2010 while JD rose
from 8%12% in 2003 to 23%-25% in 2010. Similar but marginally less striking results
are found for the Pani Nachalne group. Both these groups experienced a significant
narrowing of the educational gap with the dominant Tagadhari group. The Other caste
who did not experience the same degree of human capital increase show a much smaller
switch in importance of JD. All in all, the results indicate that discriminatory barriers
to access to better paid jobs have become the major reason for wage discrimination.
An important point to arise from our results is that the combined impact of access
of better jobs, as measured by JE and JD , is considerably higher from the Interaction
model is higher than from the Occupational and Firm size models. This is true in
both periods. This suggests that that, as claimed in our hypothesis, the lack of access
to better occupations by under-privileged groups is closely related to a lack of access
to larger firms. It also demonstrates that measures of labour market access which
are based on occupational classification alone, as in Banerjee and Knight (1985), can
under-estimate the degree of under-representation.
6.4 Robustness
As indicated in section 5, the small firm category is dominated by agricultural employ-
ment. Thus, the decomposition results discussed in the previous section might be the
effect of differences between wages paid in agriculture as opposed to other sectors of
the economy, even for workers of similar human capital endowments and case/ethnic
identities. We therefore estimated all three decomposition models by using sub-samples
that exclude agricultural workers.
The results from this analysis are presented in Tables 15 and 16. These results are
consistent with the full-sample decomposition results in both periods of the analysis.
Since this sub-sample would be expected to have a larger proportion of employment
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in the formal sector and/or in larger firms, where education matters relatively more,
it would be expected to result in a higher value of the educational effects on the wage
differential. The results show that this is true for 2010 but there is not much change in
the component of discrimination attributable to educational effects in the 2003 data.
In any case, this effect remains small even in 2010 data.
Analogous to the previous decomposition results, difference in access to better jobs
plays a crucial role in explaining wage differential associated with all groups of workers
in comparison. As in the full sample, there was an increase in the combined effect of
JE and JD between the two sample periods, along with a switch in relative magnitudes
from JE to JD.
Finally, the aggregate effect of JE and JD in the Interaction decomposition model is
higher than other two decomposition models in both periods and across all comparison
groups. This indicates that difference in interaction between larger firms and higher
paying occupations plays an important role in producing caste/ethnic wage differentials
and that these results are robust in the choice of different sub-samples.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we have investigated the source of caste/ethnic wage differentials by
extending the conventional Oaxaca decomposition methodology to include both occu-
pational and firm size effects into the model. Two waves of National Living Standard
Survey (NLSS) data from Nepal are employed. This study covers a time span of seven
years and includes a period of radical political change in Nepal, including the over-
throw of a century-long monarchy. Such changes were likely to influence labor market
outcomes in the country. Additionally, this period also witnessed major public policy
interventions to empower backward caste/ethnic groups by offering them quotas in
public sector jobs.
We found a significant level of caste/ethnic discrimination to exist in the Nepalese
labour market, which has in fact increased over the period of analysis. At the same
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time, the results shows that only a small portion of the wage differentials can be
attributed to caste/ethnic differences in human capital attainment. The results also
suggest that only a relatively small component of the wage differential is coming from
discriminatory behaviour once workers are employed in identical jobs. As we argued in
the Introduction, and thus motivated the use of the extended Oaxaca decomposition
methodology, a significant portion of the wage differential is coming from the difference
in access to better paid jobs. These are jobs associated with better occupations and/or
larger firms.
Within the components of discrimination that are related to access to jobs, dur-
ing the 2003 period, the explained component of the wage differential dominated the
unexplained component. This implies that non-dominant groups’ access to better oc-
cupations and firms was constrained by their inferior human capital endowments in
the data from 2003. However, by 2010, these groups seem to have considerably im-
proved their human capital attainment but were still not able to gain access to the
better-paying occupations and firms. This was reflected in a reversal of the relative
importance of explained and unexplained portions of difference in group access to jobs.
Our results therefore suggest that access to better paying jobs, in better occupa-
tions and larger firms, is the main factor underlying castewage differentials in Nepal.
Moreover, there are market barriers other than lack of educational endowments that
undermine access of workers belonging to under-privileged groups to the more lucrative
jobs. Future study could attempt to identify the economic factors, if any, behind such
barriers; however, it is beyond the scope of the current study.
An interesting finding of this paper, especially from the methodological view point,
is that firm size effects, when taken together with occupational effects, play an im-
portant role in determining caste ethnic wage differential in the labour market. The
Interaction model shows higher effects than the other two models which are based on
occupation alone and firm-size alone. This implies that the conventional Oaxaca de-
composition which was later extended to incorporate occupational distribution might
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fail to estimate precisely the source of wage differential among workers, particularly in
countries that have imperfectly competitive labour markets.
Two points of policy concern arise from our results. First, the increase in gaps
in access to better jobs between 2003 and 2010 suggests that the government’s policy
of imposing caste/ethnic quotas in public sector employment has not been enough
to overcome other barriers that prevent under-privileged workers from accessing such
jobs. Second, our results suggest that pre-market or explained (by differences in human
capital) effects on wage differentials dominated the current market or unexplained
effects in the earlier period but not in the more recent period. This implies that pure
discrimination has increased.
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Appendix: Variables definition
hwage= All payments against the job such as cash, in-kind, bonus, transport, and
medical allowances calculated on hourly basis.
Education= Years of schooling completed (Highest level completed).
Experience= Age -years of schooling -6.
Married=1, if individual is married; and 0, otherwise.
Ethnic Dummies
Tagadhari=1, if ethnicity belongs to Brahman, Chhetri, Newar and Yadav; and 0,
otherwise.
Matwali=1, if ethnicity belongs to Gurung, Magar, Tharu, Tamang, Yadav, Rai and
Limbu; and 0, otherwise.
Pani Nachalne=1, if ethnicity belongs to Damai, Kami, Sarki and Muslim; and 0,
otherwise.
Other caste=1, if own ethnicity is not mentioned (ethnicity reported as in other
category) and those not included in the above categories; and 0, otherwise.
Firm size Dummies
Small firm=1, if number of employee is 1; and 0, otherwise.
Medium firm =1, if number of employees is 2-10; and 0, otherwise.
Large firm= 1, if number of employees is more than 10; and 0, otherwise.
Occupational Dummies
Service=1, if occupation is travel, trekking, cooking, housekeeping , care takers,
laundry workers, barbers and other service worker; and 0, otherwise.
Clerical=1, if occupation is clerk, typist, book keeper, telephone operator, military,
other clerical; and 0, otherwise.
Professional=1, if occupation is Doctor, engineer, administrative executive, religious
professional etc.; and 0, otherwise.
Unskilled= 1, if occupation is all not included in other category; and 0, otherwise.
Agri-worker=1, if occupation is farm manager, farm worker, agricultural worker,
forestry worker, fisherman, hunters and trapper; and 0, otherwise.
Skilled=1, if occupation is metal processor, chemical processor, plumbers welders,
jewelery workers, paper makers; and 0, otherwise.
Sales=1, if occupation is working proprietor, sales supervisor, sales person, insurance,
real estate, other sales workers; and 0, otherwise.
Regional Dummies
Far-western =1, if individual works in far-western administrative region; and 0,
otherwise.
Mid-western =1, if individual works in mid-western administrative region; and 0,
otherwise.
Western =1, if individual works in eastern administrative region; and 0, otherwise.
Central=1, if individual works in central administrative region; and 0, otherwise.
Eastern =1, if individual works in eastern administrative region; and 0, otherwise.
Abroad=1, if individual works outside the country; and 0, otherwise.
Industry Dummies
Agricultural=1, if industry is agricultural, forestry and logging and fishing; and 0,
otherwise.
Mining=1, if industry is coal mining, petroleum gas, metal mining and other mining;
and 0, otherwise.
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Manufacturing=1, if industry is food and beverage, textile apparel, wood furniture
paper printing, handicrafts, other metallic; and 0, otherwise.
Construction=1, if industry is buildings, street highways, water ports project,
irrigation, electricity gas and water; and 0, otherwise.
Trade=1, if industry is wholesale, retail and restaurant; and 0, otherwise.
FRE=1, if industry is finance, insurance and real estate; and 0, otherwise.
Servicesec=1, if industry is transport, communication, recreation and cultural and
international; and 0, otherwise.
Others=1, if industry is not included in above categories; and 0, otherwise.
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Table 1: Nepal Social Hierarchy: 1854
Hierarchy Habitat Belief/Religion
A.Water Acceptable(Pure)
1.Tagadhari:/Wearer of the sacred thread
“Upper Caste” (Brahman) Hills Hinduism
“ Upper caste” (Madhesi) Tarai Hinduism
“ Upper Caste” (Newar) Kathmandu Valley Hindusim
2. Matwali:/ Alcohol drinkers(non-enslavable)
Gurung, Magar, Sunuwar Hills Tribal / Shamanism
Thakali, Rai, Limbu Hills Tribal / Shamanism
Newar Kathmandu Valley Buddhism
3. Matwali:/ Alcohol drinkers(enslavable)
Bhote(Tamang) Mountain/Hills Buddhisim
Gharti,Chepang, Hayu Hills
Kumal , Tharu Inner Tarai Animism
B. Water unacceptable (Impure)
1. Pani Nachalne / Touchable
Dhobi, Kasai, Kusule, Kalu Kathmandu Valley Hinduism
Musalman Tarai Islam
Mlechha(Foreigner) Europe Christianity etc.
2. Pani Nachalne / Untouchable(achhut)
Badi, Damai ,Gaine Hill Hinduism
Kadara, Kami, Sarki(Parbatiya) Hills Hinduism
Chhyame, Pode (Newar) Kathmandu Valley Hinduism
Source: Adapted from Bennett et.al (2008).
Table 2: Caste/ethnic Distribution of Wage Employees
Year: 2003 Year: 2010
Ethnic group Obs. % Obs. %
Tagadhari 1488 33.13 1597 38.31
Matwali 1168 26.00 998 23.94
Pani Nachalne 785 17.47 564 13.53
Other caste 1051 23.40 1010 24.23
Total 4490 100 4169 100
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Table 3: Firm Size Distribution
Responded Imputed
Obs. % Obs. %
Year: 2003
Small firm 111 7.84 3186 70.96
Medium firm 576 40.71 582 12.96
Large firm 728 51.45 722 16.08
Total 1415 100 4490 100
Year: 2010
Small firm 117 6.13 2218 53.2
Medium firm 646 33.84 650 15.59
Large firm 1146 60.03 1301 31.21
Total 1909 100 4169 100
Table 4: Descriptive Statistics: 2003
2003
Variables Total Tagadhari Matwali Pani Nachalne Other caste
lhwage 2.69 3.00 2.62 2.50 2.48
Education 3.51 5.72 2.70 1.75 2.61
Small firm 3705 744 959 670 814
Medium firm 604 292 114 64 108
large firm 754 450 95 50 128
Central 1610 658 371 228 352
Eastern 799 141 247 161 248
Western 531 161 185 113 72
Mid-western 309 102 103 67 37
Far-western 166 70 58 29 09
Abroad 1077 354 204 186 332
Unskilled 719 278 223 91 126
Professional 565 383 68 28 85
Clerical 153 102 13 13 24
Service 140 61 38 19 22
Sales 87 42 12 05 28
Agricultural 2153 370 644 509 629
Skilled 675 250 170 119 136
Agriculture 53 20 18 07 08
Mining 34 10 13 07 04
Manufacturing 593 236 130 105 122
Construction 544 172 192 72 108
Trade 139 86 16 11 26
Finance 39 34 02 00 03
Service 768 446 147 59 116
Others 2318 482 650 523 663
Obs. 4488 1486 1168 784 1050
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Table 5: Descriptive Statistics: 2010
2010
Variables Total Tagadhari Matwali Pani Nachalne Other caste
lhwage 3.38 3.67 3.32 3.15 3.10
Education 5.43 8.26 4.64 2.82 3.18
Small firm 2218 465 628 432 693
Medium firm 650 342 132 63 113
large firm 1301 790 238 69 204
Eastern 938 226 302 109 301
Central 2053 976 468 153 456
Western 809 275 191 182 161
Mid-western 618 240 187 149 42
Far-western 380 197 70 88 25
Abroad 245 40 27 38 140
Unskilled 972 348 292 151 181
Professional 427 311 63 10 43
Clerical 325 237 40 15 33
Service 534 231 119 80 104
Sales 150 73 29 21 27
Agricultural 1676 352 450 332 542
Skilled 959 402 252 110 195
Agriculture 1704 354 455 337 558
Mining 69 25 20 08 16
Manufacturing 594 227 144 93 130
Construction 861 304 249 160 148
Trade 171 89 32 18 32
Service 425 201 119 37 68
Finance 127 87 25 04 11
Others 1092 667 201 62 162
Obs. 4169 1597 998 564 1010
Table 6: Wages by Occupation and Firm Size
2003 2010
Occupation Small firm Medium firm Large firm Small firm Medium firm Large firm
Unskilled 2.56(.83) 2.85(.94) 3.11(.72) 2.82(.83) 3.14(.86) 3.63(.71)
Professional 3.19(1.22) 3.40(.88) 3.73(.85) 3.85(1.01) 4.37(.77) 4.44(.93)
Clerical 2.52(1.41) 3.12(.62) 3.68(.81) 4.94(1.20) 3.69(.76) 3.91(.68)
Service 2.82(.92) 2.71(.89) 3.22(1.22) 3.02(.73) 3.29(.78) 3.53(.90)
Sales 2.79(.99) 2.60(.73) 3.17(.88) 3.02(.57) 3.25(.60) 3.85(.63)
Agri-worker 2.28(.63) 3.50(.99) 3.88(.68) 3.03(.58) 2.34(.61) 3.57(.94)
Skilled 2.73(.88) 3.08(.87) 3.06(.82) 3.11(.70) 3.28(.82) 3.97(.89)
Note: Standard deviation is presented in the parenthesis.
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Table 7: OLS Regression Results: Year, 2003
All Tagadhari Matwali Pani Nachalne Other caste Dummy
1 2 3 4 5 6
Education .038***(.004) .043***(.007) .026***(.009) .013(.011) .037***(.010) .027***(.004)
Experience .019***(.003) .024***(.005) .017***(.005) -.003(.008) .012*(.007) .013***(.003)
Experience2 -.000(000) -.000(.000) 000(000) -.000(000) -.000(000) -000(000)
Married .068**(.030) .121**(.052) .050(.049) .100(.073) .067(.073) .058**(.030)
Medium firm .512***(.050) .577***(.091) .456***(.092) .434***(.114) .557***(.101) .536***(.050)
Large firm .770***(.048) .728***(.081) .703***(.115) 1.09***(.097) .800***(.110) .794***(.049)
Eastern -.265***(.063) -.112(.098) -.289***(.088) -.305(.217) -.009(.247) -.225***(.063)
Central -.101*(.061) -.008(.085) -.125(.086) -.237(.215) .151(.246) -.076(.061)
Western -.019(.065) -.077(.098) .038**(.094) -.003(.217) .206(.257) -.001(.065)
Mid-western -.122*(.067) -.019(.100) -.253**(.099) -.074(.219) .056(.276) -.108*(.067)
Abroad -.148***(.062) -.146*(.087) -.031(.095) -.016(.216) .093(.246) -.108*(.063)
Professional .237***(.062) .294***(.088) .076(.143) -.164(.214) .268*(.171) .256***(.062)
Clerical .141*(.091) .062(.110) .694**(.351) .596*(.394) .155(.228) .159*(.091)
Service .108(.130) -.153(.156) .288(.326) -.551**(.271) 1.00***(.307) .119(.132)
Sales -.144***(.133) -.297(.207) .186(.241) -.362(.412) .016(.243) -.116(.134)
Agri-worker .489***(.062) .410***(.105) .802***(.122) .942***(.143) .360**(.148) .511***(.062)
Skilled .088**(.042) .097(.075) .118*(.071) .253**(.106) -.009(.105) .093**(.043)
Mining -.004(.164) .055(.243) -.073(.305) .356(.315) -.334(.442) -.002(.164)
Manufacturing -.117**(.092) -.131(.164) .064(.157) -.054(.240) -.193(.291) -.094(.093)
Construction .423***(.088) .506***(.162) .458***(.148) .331(.229) .443*(.288)) .441***(.089)
Trade -.342***(.132) -.273(.199) -.015(.249) .198(.294) -.749*(.389) -.336**(.132)
FRE .531***(.191) .506**(.231) - - .557*(.306) .521**(.191)
Servicesec .032(.092) -.033(.157) .334**(.164) .208(.238) -.033(.299) .038(.093)
Others -.516***(.092) .238*(.162) -.649***(.167) -.870***(.231) -.611**(.288)-.505***(.092)
Matwali - - - - - -.010(.030)
Pani Nachalne - - - - - -.072**(.033)
Other caste - - - - - -.162***(.033)
Constant 2.15***(.111) 1.91***(.185) 2.10***(.188) 2.36***(.312) 2.07***(.359) 2.25***(.113)
R-square .2951 .2961 .2646 .2782 0.3233 .2973
Obs. 4490 1488 1168 785 1051 4490
Notes: Robust Standard Error in the parenthesis. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%
and *** significant at 1%.
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Table 8: OLS Regression Results: Year, 2010
All Tagadhari Matwali Pani Nachalne Other caste Dummy
1 2 3 4 5 6
Education .060***(.004).060***(.007).057***(.008) .055***(.012) .059***(.008) .055***(.003)
Experience .029***(.003).038***(.005) .016**(.006) .020**(.009) .026***(.006) .028***(.003)
Experience2 -.000(.000) -.000(.000) -.000(.000) -.000(.000) -.000(.000) -.000(.000)
Married .058*(.039) .030(.062) .276***(.071) -.048(.103) -.004(.089) .056**(.034)
Medium firm .111*(.055) .172*(.108) .080(.121) -.020(.167) .112(.125) .136**(.064)
Large firm .435***(.054).444***(.108).461***(.111) .495***(.168) .428***(.106) .467**(.062)
Eastern .114**(.047) .008(.097) .268***(.068) .236***(.092) .321**(.146) .124***(.048)
Central .126***(.047) .012(.092) .400***(.070) .065(.082) .373**(.145) .153***(.040)
Western .032(.050) -.112(.102) .222***(.075) -.011(.077) .257*(.155) .032(.043)
Mid-western .114**(.053) -.075(.114) .314***(.081) .133*(.086) .254*(.159) .104**(.042)
Abroad -.137**(.067) -.062(.147) .071(.139) -.276**(.129) .161(.160) -.073(.063)
Professional .603***(.065).565***(.096).650***(.154) .386(.284) .707***(.142) .619***(.065)
Sales -.116(.117) -.247*(.153) .437(.405) -.098(.297) .066(.186) -.173*(.103)
Agri-worker -.133*(.086) .175*(.126) -.307*(.187) .106(.278) .087(.106) -.028(.060)
Service .004(.059) .004(.093) .122(.129) .134(.189) .022(.126) -.027(.048)
Skilled .135***(.053) .111(.086) .252**(.113) .105(.162) .172*(.106) .180**(.031)
Clerical .156***(.062) .160*(.093) .092(.140) -.061(.296) .308**(.125) .211***(.052)
Mining -.068(.123) -.284**(.134) -.178(.261) - .459(.353) -.017(.086)
Manufacturing -.118*(.066) -.146(.141) -.234*(.131) .038(.163) -.102(.101) -.067(.066)
Construction .282***(.052).343***(.132) .047(.082) .415***(.115) .388***(.096) .279***(.061)
Trade .004(.110) .076(.161) .497(.370) .498**(.262) -.195(.155) .183*(.100)
Servicesec -.112*(.067) -.198*(.124) -.236*(.135) .180(.170) .015(.137) .066(.072)
FRE .156*(.104) .168(.158) .053(.221) -.073(.473) .224(.237) .285(.108)
Others -.109*(.063) -.089(.125) -.285**(.114) -.099(.152) -.074(.117) .013(.069)
Matwali - - - - - .029(.030)
Pani Nachalne - - - - - .067**(.034)
Other caste - - - - - -.104***(.029))
Constant 2.30***(.055)2.32***(.103)2.22***(.093) 2.56***(.125) 2.06***(.168) 2.37***(.078)
R-square .3801 .3745 .3450 .2306 .3433 .3871
Obs. 4169 1597 998 564 1010 4169
Notes: Robust Standard Error in the parenthesis. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%
and *** significant at 1%.
36
Table 9: Occupational Distribution in % by Caste/Ethnic Groups
Year:2003
Occupation Tagadhari Matwali Pani Nachalne Othrcaste
Actual Actual Predicted Actual Predicted Actual Predicted
Unskilled 0.18 0.12 0.19 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.13
Professional 0.25 0.03 0.14 0.03 0.12 0.08 0.18
Clerical 0.07 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.04
Service 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
Sales 0.02 0.001 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03
Agriworker 0.55 0.64 0.39 0.65 0.44 0.59 0.39
Skilled 0.16 0.14 0.18 0.15 0.22 0.13 0.18
Total 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Year:2010
Unskilled 0.08 0.10 0.10 0.08 0.10 0.12 0.12
Professional 0.19 0.06 0.16 0.01 0.09 0.08 0.15
Clerical 0.15 0.04 0.08 0.02 0.11 0.02 0.08
Service 0.10 0.05 0.07 0.06 0.10 0.03 0.12
Sales 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.04
Agriworker 0.25 0.58 0.32 0.72 0.33 0.60 0.28
Skilled 0.17 0.13 0.22 0.07 0.20 0.13 0.18
Total 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Table 10: Firm Size Distribution by Caste/Ethnic Groups
Year:2003
Firm size Tagadhari Matwali Pani Nachalne Othrcaste
Actual Actual Predicted Actual Predicted Actual Predicted
Small 0.50 0.82 0.69 0.85 0.69 0.77 0.63
Medium 0.19 0.10 0.16 0.08 0.17 0.10 0.14
Large 0.30 0.08 0.14 0.06 0.13 0.12 0.21
Total 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Year:2010
Small 0.29 0.63 0.51 0.36 0.40 0.69 0.36
Medium 0.22 0.13 0.21 0.11 0.28 0.11 0.21
Large 0.49 0.24 0.43 0.12 0.32 0.20 0.43
Total 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
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Table 11: Firm Size*Occupation Distribution by Caste/Ethnic Groups: Year, 2003
Interaction Tagadhari Matwali Pani Nachalne Othrcaste
Actual Actual Predicted Actual Predicted Actual Predicted
Unskilled*small firm 0.11 0.14 0.13 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.09
Unskilled*medium firm 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01
Unskilled*large firm 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.003 0.008 0.01 0.01
Professional*small firm 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03
Professional*medium firm 0.07 0.02 0.06 0.01 0.06 0.02 0.04
Professional*large firm 0.15 0.02 0.06 0.01 0.04 0.04 0.10
Clerical*small firm 0.005 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.004
Clerical*medium firm 0.02 0.001 0.01 0.006 0.02 0.005 0.01
Clerical*large firm 0.04 0.003 0.008 0.007 0.03 0.01 0.03
Service*small firm 0.01 0.02 .02 0.009 0.006 0.01 0.01
Service*medium firm 0.009 0.006 0.01 0.005 0.009 0.003 0.008
Service*large firm 0.01 0.005 0.009 0.005 0.009 0.003 0.004
Sales*small firm 0.005 0.005 0.003 0.001 0.005 0.007 0.005
Sales*medium firm 0.01 0.002 0.004 0.002 0.008 0.01 0.01
Sales*large firm 0.004 0.001 0.004 0.001 0.001 0.006 0.01
Agriworker*small firm 0.22 0.53 0.37 0.62 0.42 0.55 0.35
Agriworker*medium firm 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01
Agriworker*large firm 0.01 0.008 0.005 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02
Skilled*small firm 0.10 0.11 0.13 0.10 0.15 0.09 0.12
Skilled*medium firm 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.01 0.02
Skilled*large firm 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02
Total 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
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Table 12: Firm Size*Occupation Distribution by Caste/Ethnic Groups: Year, 2010
Interaction Tagadhari Matwali Pani Nachalne Othrcaste
Actual Actual Predicted Actual Predicted Actual Predicted
Unskilled*small firm 0.12 0.19 0.13 0.17 0.11 0.10 0.08
Unskilled*medium firm 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01
Unskilled*large firm 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05
Professional*small firm 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.006 0.001 0.001
Professional*medium firm 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.001 0.006 0.001 0.02
Professional*large firm 0.12 0.04 0.09 0.01 0.06 0.03 0.10
Clerical*small firm 0.001 0.00 0.001 0.00 0.00 0.001 0.00
Clerical*medium firm 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.001 0.02
Clerical*large firm 0.08 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.002 0.05
Service*small firm 0.04 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.08 0.04 0.04
Service*medium firm 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.02
Service*large firm 0.05 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.06
Sales*small firm 0.001 0.01 0.009 0.02 0.02 0.001 0.004
Sales*medium firm 0.02 0.001 0.005 0.001 0.02 0.01 0.02
Sales*large firm 0.007 0.001 0.20 0.001 0.01 0.001 0.005
Agriworker*small firm 0.17 0.35 0.002 0.46 0.18 0.48 0.23
Agriworker*medium firm 0.002 0.001 0.004 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Agriworker*large firm 0.002 0.004 0.10 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.00
Skilled*small firm 0.07 0.10 0.06 0.10 0.13 0.10 0.12
Skilled*medium firm 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.03 0.08 0.04 0.07
Skilled*large 0.10 0.06 0.10 0.02 0.07 0.03 0.07
Total 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
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Table 13: Main Decomposition Result: Year, 2003
Tagadhari Vs Matwali
Pin ∗ fd(Xd −Xn) Pin ∗Xn(fd − fn) wid(pid − pˆin) wid(pˆin − pin)
WE WD JE JD
Occupational 0.0342 0.0477 0.1800 0.0830
Firm size 0.0522 0.0392 0.1759 0.1003
Interaction 0.0220 0.0308 0.2142 0.1246
Tagadhari Vs Pani Nachalne
Occupational 0.0623 0.0052 0.1547 0.1413
Firm size 0.0784 0.0165 0.1786 0.1235
Interaction 0.0545 -0.0861 0.2082 0.1617
Tagadhari Vs Other caste
Occupational 0.0628 -0.0196 0.0990 0.1427
Firm size 0.0709 -0.0260 0.1109 0.1240
Interaction 0.0321 -0.0637 0.1165 0.1672
Table 14: Main Decomposition Result: Year, 2010
Tagadhari Vs Matwali
Pin ∗ fd(Xd −Xn) Pin ∗Xn(fd − fn) wid(pid − pˆin) wid(pˆin − pin)
WE WD JE JD
Occupational 0.0310 -0.0017 0.0643 0.2431
Firm size 0.0587 0.0431 0.0612 0.2224
Interaction 0.0157 -0.0731 0.0800 0.2474
Tagadhari Vs Paninachalne
Occupational 0.0317 0.0704 0.1295 0.3071
Firm size 0.0848 0.0123 0.1276 0.2735
Interaction 0.0105 0.0715 0.1830 0.2737
Tagadhari Vs Other caste
Occupational 0.1169 -0.0732 0.0781 0.2940
Firm size 0.0851 -0.0199 0.0657 0.2662
Interaction 0.0042 -0.0411 0.1072 0.2786
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Table 15: Sub-sample Decomposition Result: Year, 2003
Tagadhari Vs Matwali
Pin ∗ fd(Xd −Xn) Pin ∗Xn(fd − fn) wid(pid − pˆin) wid(pˆin − pin)
WE WD JE JD
Occupational 0.0330 0.0744 0.0900 0.0677
Firm size 0.0764 0.0464 0.1069 0.0851
Interaction 0.0057 0.1411 0.0971 0.0960
Tagadhari Vs Paninachalne
Occupational 0.0572 0.0307 0.0882 0.0798
Firm size 0.0763 0.0464 0.1068 0.0851
Interaction 0.0283 0.0992 0.1091 0.0855
Tagadhari Vs Other caste
Occupational 0.0188 0.0211 0.0676 0.0493
Firm size 0.0290 -0.0144 0.0845 0.0453
Interaction 0.0117 -0.0304 0.0824 0.0568
Table 16: Sub-sample Decomposition: Year, 2010
Tagadhari Vs Matwali
Pin ∗ fd(Xd −Xn) Pin ∗Xn(fd − fn) wid(pid − pˆin) wid(pˆin − pin)
WE WD JE JD
occupational 0.0825 0.0678 0.0259 0.1196
Firm size 0.1541 0.1590 0.0304 0.080
Interaction 0.0522 -0.1002 0.0493 0.1604
Tagadhari Vs paninachalne
Occupational 0.1543 0.3925 0.0538 0.1864
Firm size 0.2910 0.2330 0.0689 0.0918
Interaction 0.0944 0.3867 0.1097 0.2202
Tagadhari Vs Othrcaste
Occupational 0.1200 0.0133 0.0742 0.1208
Firm size 0.2259 0.0099 0.0584 0.0682
Interaction 0.0781 -0.0047 0.1162 0.1489
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